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ABSTRACT 
It has become widely accepted that focusing exclusively on income growth may lead to a too 
narrow-sighted measure of changes in well-being. People care about other dimensions of life, such 
as their health, employment, social interactions and personal safety. Moreover, an exclusive focus 
on income growth remains blind to the distribution of income and well-being in the society. We 
propose therefore a set of five principles for a richer measure of well-being. In particular, we 
advocate the use of a measure based on “equivalent incomes”, which satisfies these principles. We 
discuss and illustrate how this equivalent income approach can be implemented in Europe, using the 
ESS data for 2008 and 2010. We find that introducing inequality aversion and including other 
dimensions in the analysis leads to a remarkably different perspective on the growth of well-being in 
Europe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a series of  measures of well-being that go “beyond GDP” have been proposed, both in the 
academic world and in policy circles. In the academic world, inspiration has been found in the so-
called Sen-Nussbaum approach to human capabilities as well as in the rapidly growing literature on 
happiness and subjective well-being. Browsing through the recent issues of this journal, for instance, 
one can find numerous examples of both approaches.3 In policy circles, the most popular example of 
a measure that extends beyond GDP is the Human Development Index (HDI), proposed by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI hinges on the capability approach and 
measures the performance of countries in terms of their income, health and education. Another 
example is the “Better Life Initiative” launched by the OECD in 2011 (OECD, 2011). Also the 
European Commission has stressed the urgent need to collect more and better information for 
measuring well-being and sustainable development in its Communication on “GDP and beyond” 
(European Commission, 2009). The European Statistical System is encouraging the collection of the 
information necessary to construct a multidimensional measure of the quality of life in its different 
member states (European Statistical System, 2011). All these initiatives have been spurred further by 
the publication of the so-called Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report in 2009, which took stock of the existing 
approaches to measuring well-being and strengthened the link between academic insights and the 
various policy initiatives. 
In this paper we will concentrate on the measurement of well-being of the present generations. This 
question constitutes only one of the streams of the literature that aims to go beyond GDP. An 
alternative (or complementary) approach focuses on the sustainability of growth, i.e., on the 
question whether it is possible to guarantee to future generations the same living standard as the 
one that is enjoyed by the current generations. A set of indicators have been proposed to measure 
sustainability, often aiming at the construction of a corrected or “green” GDP. Safeguarding 
sustainability is indeed an essential objective, but in our view sustainability is better measured by 
separate indicators (for instance, by measuring the level of capital that is transmitted to future 
generations) than by correcting the GDP of the current generation. We consider it therefore a 
different topic.4  
There is also some overlap between the literature on going beyond GDP and the research on the 
development of a comprehensive list of specific policy indicators to gauge progress with respect to 
multiple policy objectives. An example is the list of social indicators, proposed by Atkinson et al. 
(2002). As another example, the Europe 2020 strategy has put forward a set of specific targets (such 
as reducing school drop-out rates below 10% or having 75% of the 20-64 years old employed by 
2020). Adequate policy surveillance requires the formulation of specific policy targets, but these 
operational targets often refer to variables that are inputs in the process of creating well-being, 
rather than focusing on the directly important outputs, i.e., life dimensions that contribute to well-
being. Devoting 3% of the EU’s GDP to research and innovation, for instance, (which is one of the 
                                                                
3
 See Diener and Suh (1997) and Bleys (2012) for surveys and a classification, amongst others. A recent 
theoretical discussion of the various approaches to go beyond GDP is provided by Fleurbaey and Blanchet 
(2013). See Decancq et al. (2014) on the relation between inequality, income, and well-being. 
4
 Neumayer (1999) provides a similar argument and Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) an extensive discussion. 
The conclusion that sustainability should be measured separately can also been found in the Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi (2009) report – and is underlying the initiatives at the EU and the OECD level.  
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Europe 2020 targets) is likely to contribute to the future well-being of European citizens, but is not 
one of the life dimensions about which citizens directly care. 
Even within the stream of the beyond GDP literature that focuses on the measurement of  well-
being, there exists a bewildering variety of approaches. Opinions differ about what are relevant 
dimensions of life and whether (and how) they should be aggregated. Some claim that aggregation 
over the various dimensions leads to an unacceptable loss of information (Nussbaum, 2000); others 
argue that it is unavoidable and can therefore be better done in an explicit way (Fleurbaey and 
Blanchet, 2013). Some (e.g. Layard, 2005) claim that subjective satisfaction and happiness should be 
the single criterion to measure well-being (making the discussion on aggregation over the different 
life dimensions superfluous), while others argue that happiness is too subjective even to be taken up 
in the list of life dimensions (Adler, 2013; Nussbaum, 2008). In addition, there are the well-known 
disagreements on how to handle distribution and inequality when we want to measure well-being 
for society as a whole.   
In section 2, we summarize our position with respect to these basic questions by means of a set of 
principles. Each of these principles can (and should) be debated, but we believe that making the 
underlying principles of our approach explicit helps to make the debate more transparent. In section 
3 we then describe one specific proposal to measure well-being that satisfies our underlying 
principles: the so-called equivalent income measure. We will discuss what data are needed to 
implement the concept of equivalent income. It will turn out that it is sufficient to include in a  
regular fashion a small set of standard questions in existing large-scale surveys. We will illustrate the 
main features of our approach with data from the European Social Survey for 2008 and 2010. We 
present the data and our computation method in section 4 and the results in section 5. We find that 
introducing other dimensions of life in addition to standard income measures changes the ranking of 
countries in terms of well-being and hence changes our perspective on social progress. Section 6 
concludes. 
The main purpose of this paper is to convey an intuitive general idea of the equivalent income 
approach without going into the technical details. More formal and rigorous treatments can be 
found, inter alia, in Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), Fleurbaey et al. 
(2009) and Schokkaert et al. (2011). The concept of equivalent income is discussed and used for 
intercountry comparisons in recent work by the OECD (OECD, 2014). Also Fleurbaey and Gaulier 
(2009) have calculated equivalent incomes for different countries. Yet, the countries and the period 
considered are different, as is the technique to measure equivalent incomes. A direct comparison 
between their results and ours is therefore difficult. 
2. TOWARDS AN AGGREGATE MEASURE OF WELL-BEING: SOME PRINCIPLES 
 
Historically, concepts such as happiness and well-being have been interpreted in many different 
ways, ranging from an almost metaphysical concept (rooted in religion) to a psychological 
description in terms of feelings and emotions (McMahon, 2005). Present day discussions are 
obscured by the lasting presence of many of these interpretations. It should therefore be 
emphasized from the outset that in the context of policy evaluation, well-being and social progress 
are essentially political and ethical concepts. Formulating an adequate measure of social progress 
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involves the implicit or explicit acceptance of a set of objectives that society should strive after. In 
this section we state explicitly such a set of normative principles. Section 3 then proposes a specific 
way of operationalizing this approach. 
A. FOCUSING ON INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING 
To us, social progress means an increase in the well-being of the individual members of society. This 
individual oriented view is widely shared among European citizens and policy makers and is arguably 
the most reasonable position in a democratic society. In the past, the main challenge to this 
approach came from nationalistic movements formulating objectives directly at the level of the 
nation, but nowadays even nationalistic ideologies start from the interests of individual citizens – the 
discussion centers around the definition of citizenship.5  
It should be clear that the well-being of individuals is not fully determined by their income position 
or material consumption. Individuals also care about their health, about the quality of their job and 
their personal relations, about their social interactions and personal safety, and about the natural 
environment in which they live.6 The starting point of any encompassing measure of well-being must 
therefore be the collection of information on these different dimensions of life. As noted above, 
measuring well-being is very different from creating a dashboard of indicators for evaluating policies. 
Policy targets are relevant when they are seen as inputs, which indirectly contribute to well-being as 
outcome. Yet, they should not directly enter into a measure of well-being as their impact on 
individual well-being may be very different, depending on the characteristics of the individual 
(providing better public transportation, for instance, may have a very different impact on the 
effective mobility of different individuals). 
We formulate this as a first principle: 
Principle 1 (Focus on individual well-being). The ultimate goal of policy (and the ultimate criterion to 
evaluate social progress) is the well-being of the individuals making up a society. To measure well-
being, information must be collected on the different dimensions of life that are important for this 
well-being. This information should be about relevant outcomes, and not about inputs. 
Our focus on individual well-being does not exclude that the collective characteristics of a country 
play an important role. Yet, these collective features should play through their effects on individual 
well-being. This has the definite advantage that it also allows the integration of distributional 
considerations in these collective dimensions: a healthy and attractive natural environment and a 
safe neighborhood are typically local public goods in the economic jargon, and the spacing of the 
population over the territory is not random. A striking example from the US is discussed by Currie 
(2011) who shows that pregnant mothers living near a toxic release inventory give birth to less 
healthy babies – and that low-educated black mothers are heavily overrepresented in the population 
living in these neighborhoods. 
                                                                
5
 Even communitarians will argue that community ties are essential mainly because they define what 
constitutes an individual. The individual remains the central reference point. A recent challenge to our focus 
on individual human well-being is perhaps the animal rights movement. This issue is not taken up in this paper. 
6
 As documented by a large scale survey organised by the World Bank, even the poorest among the globally 
poor see poverty and well-being as multidimensional notions (Narayan et al., 2000). A similar conclusion has 
been reached by a qualitative study carried out by Eurobarometer in Europe (Eurobarometer 2011).  
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While the general principle guiding the choice of dimensions seems well-defined, there is still a long 
way to go before we arrive at a specific list. One can formulate these dimensions at an aggregated 
(e.g. overall health) or a very specific level (e.g. presence of specific diseases). The former approach 
may result in a great deal of overlap, the latter approach in a long and intractable list of variables. At 
a more fundamental level, there are different views on how to justify the choice of relevant 
dimensions. The most well-known list of dimensions has been proposed by Nussbaum (2000). It is 
grounded in an objective Aristotelian view of what is essential for human flourishing. At the other 
extreme, one can situate attempts to base the list on direct questioning of the individuals concerned 
(see, for example, Clark, 2005). Somewhere in between these two positions we find Sen’s (2004) 
proposal that we decide about the relevant list through public reasoning in a democratic process. 
Alkire (2002) gives an interesting overview of different lists that have been proposed in the 
literature. This overview leads to a somewhat surprising conclusion: despite the large variety of 
approaches and the differences in opinion about the underlying logic, the specific proposals are 
strikingly similar. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
The same is true for the lists that have been proposed for practical applications. There appears to be 
some consensus to work with a first layer of broader encompassing dimensions that may, if 
necessary, be made operational through a second layer containing more specific indicators. Table 1 
summarizes and compares the lists that were put forward by the European Statistical System (2011) 
and by the OECD (2011). The similarities are striking. If one accepts (as we do) that the ultimate aim 
is to arrive at a single synthetic indicator of well-being, the similarities are even more reassuring, 
since (partial) overlap will be taken care of through the choice of the weights used to get at the 
synthetic indicator. 
B. TOWARDS A SYNTHETIC INDICATOR, CAPTURING CUMULATIVE DEPRIVATION 
Suppose that we have reached consensus about a possible list of life dimensions. Many observers 
prefer to remain at that level and exhibit a strong resistance towards indicator aggregation. As an 
example, in the present proposals for the European Statistical System it is stated explicitly that 
“aggregation should be limited to transparent methods with a sound scientific basis agreed upon by 
the statistical community. (...) Composite indicators combining individual indicators that have no 
common meaningful unit of measurement and implying arbitrary choices for weighting the sub-
indicators cannot be labeled as official statistics and should thus remain in the research or political 
sphere” (European Statistical System, 2011, p. 13). This position is understandable from the 
perspective of a guardian of official statistics. There is indeed no consensus about the best 
aggregation procedure.7 However, agnosticism at the statistical level should not be translated into a 
similar agnosticism at the political level. If different situations have to be evaluated in a coherent 
way, one cannot avoid constructing a synthetic indicator. 
                                                                
7
 Somarriba and Pena (2009) illustrate the low consistency across three methods to compute the weights of a 
composite well-being indicator for various European countries. Decancq et al. (2013) provide a comparison of 
various weighting schemes based on Flemish data. See Decancq and Lugo (2013) for a critical survey of 
different methods to select a weighting scheme for a composite well-being indicator.  
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Let us first make a pragmatic point. The main motivation to go beyond GDP is to broaden the scope 
of effects that are considered when evaluating policies. When one sticks to the simple enumeration 
of a list of dimensions, it is likely that for all concrete policy issues one (or a few) dimensions will 
determine the decision and, more specifically, that the dimensions that are easy to quantify will 
receive a larger weight than the “softer” dimensions. Since traditional economic growth remains an 
obvious and natural candidate for consideration, the collection of information on more dimensions 
threatens to have only a limited impact on decision-making and on the public debate. Going beyond 
GDP will only become feasible if there is an attractive alternative, which is equally easy to 
understand and communicate. 
There is an additional - and more substantial - problem with rejecting the synthetic approach: 
explicit and transparent aggregation risks to be replaced by implicit and hidden trade-offs. If the 
trade-offs are not made in an explicit way, there is a danger that decisions will be incoherent over 
time, thus leading to a waste of available public resources. In fact, separate decisions may be 
strongly influenced by volatile public opinion and by one-issue lobby groups, whose relative 
influence will change over time. One may then (implicitly) give up income in favor of a slight health 
improvement on one occasion, while on another occasion decisions may lead to a relatively small 
increase in income at the expense of bad health consequences. 
Moreover, constructing a synthetic indicator is the best way of taking account of cases of cumulative 
deprivation. Assume that sufficient information on the different dimensions is available at the level 
of the individual citizens. This information can then be summarized in a matrix like the one 
presented in the light shaded area of Table 2, where xij refers to the outcome of individual i in 
dimension j. There are n individuals and k dimensions. The usual procedure to summarize the 
information in Table 2 is to calculate the average values for each dimension: this would result in a 
vector (X1,X2,...,Xk) with one value per dimension, as shown in the dark shaded row in Table 2.  Yet, 
looking only at the averages means that one completely neglects the shape of the distribution within 
each dimension.  Many people will agree  that one cannot remain totally blind for inequality. At first 
sight, the natural way to do so is to complement information about aggregate values with 
information about the distribution on the different dimensions. This idea is also incorporated in the 
proposal made by the European Statistical System (2011) that proposes measures such as “the share 
of people with an equivalized disposable income below the risk of poverty threshold”. In Table 2, we 
summarize such information in the bottom row with the distributional indicators I(.) for each 
dimension. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
While this dimension-by-dimension approach is common, it remains blind for so-called cumulative 
deprivation. Consider the simple example in Table 3, in which we compare two hypothetical 
situations A and B. In each of these situations, the society consists of two individuals. We suppose 
that there are only two dimensions to be considered, income and health, and that their values can 
be measured. In the bottom panel, the poor individual is in the worst health situation and the rich 
individual in the best health situation, whereas income and health are more mixed in the society 
described in the top panel. In this simple numerical example, the procedure described above results 
in an average value of 55 for both dimensions. As for the distributional indicator, we present the 
ratio between the highest and the lowest value in society: in our example, this is 10/1 for both 
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dimensions in both situations. The information that would be collected according to a dimension-by-
dimension approach is given in italics in the two bottom rows of Table 3. It is completely identical for 
situations A and B, which would therefore be evaluated as equally good. Arguably, this goes against 
the ethical intuitions of many.8  
[insert Table 3 about here] 
Let us look now at the last column. Suppose that we measure individual well-being as the simple 
average for all individuals over all the dimensions (which is a crude assumption, made here only for 
convenience). Average well-being is the same in situations A and B, but this is definitely not true for 
inequality in well-being. Both individuals are equally well off in situation A, but the range is 10/1 in 
situation B. The root cause of the problem is immediately clear from Table 3: in situation B income 
and health are highly correlated – individual 2 suffers from cumulative deprivation. This is not true in 
situation A. Looking at the information dimension-by-dimension hides this essential feature of the 
situation. 
It is clear, therefore, that if one cares about cumulative deprivation, one has to summarize the 
information in Table 2 row-by-row rather than column-by-column. As illustrated in the last column, 
one then constructs first a synthetic measure of well-being (say 𝑊𝑖(𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘) ) at the individual 
level and then aggregates these individual measures of well-being to get an indicator of overall social 
welfare. In Table 2 we introduced an aggregate indicator 𝑆𝑊(𝑊1, … , 𝑊𝑛) and an inequality measure 
𝐼(𝑊1, 𝑊2, … , 𝑊𝑛). We can formulate the basic insight of Tables 2-3 as follows:
9 
Principle 2 (Accounting for cumulative deprivation). Accounting for cumulative deprivation requires 
that one first constructs a synthetic index of well-being at the individual level and then aggregates 
these well-being indices across individuals. 
At this stage we did not yet take a specific position on the form such a synthetic index of well-being 
should take. As an example, simply counting the number of deprivations for an individual could be 
interpreted as a (primitive) measure of his (lack of) well-being. However, in the following section, we 
propose a more ambitious approach. 
 
C. CONSTRUCTING A SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
If one accepts this second Principle, there are two aggregation steps to arrive at an overall indicator 
of social welfare. In a first step, an index of individual well-being is constructed for each individual. In 
                                                                
8
 See, for instance, Hausman (2007, p. 50): “A state of affairs in which those who are otherwise worse off are 
healthier than those who are otherwise more fortunate is more just rather than less just than a state of affairs 
which is exactly the same except that health is equally distributed”. Or, in another context, Pogge (2002, p. 
11): “Consider institutional schemes under which half the population are poor and half have no access to 
higher education. We may plausibly judge such an order to be more unjust when the two groups coincide than 
when they are disjoint (so that no one bears both hardships)”. Ferreira and Lugo (2013) discuss the importance 
of cumulative deprivation for multidimensional poverty measurement. See Decancq (2014) on the impact of 
neglecting cumulative deprivations when measuring well-being in Russia. 
9
 This principle is aligned with Recommendation 8 of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report (2009): “Surveys should be 
designed to assess the links between various quality-of-life domains for each person, and this information 
should be used when designing policies in various fields”. 
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the second step these indices are aggregated across all individuals. For both steps one has to take an 
essentially normative position, but the underlying logic is very different. 
AGGREGATION 1. CONSTRUCTING AN INDEX OF INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING 
When considering how to weigh the different dimensions in the construction of an individual index 
of well-being, we are immediately confronted with the fact that different individuals have different 
ideas about the relative importance of the different dimensions (have different “preferences” in the 
economic jargon).10 Some people are willing to run considerable health risks to earn a larger income; 
others spend a large part of their time exercising and try to follow a healthy diet. Some prefer to live 
in a lively city with a rich supply of cultural events and many opportunities for social interactions; 
others prefer to live in a quiet natural environment. Is it then acceptable to impose one uniform 
view about what is a good life on all these citizens? We suggest that this is hard to defend if one 
accepts Principle 1 (Focus on individual well-being) and that it is much more natural to impose the 
following principle.  
Principle 3 (Respect for individual ideas about a good life). The weighting scheme applied to 
construct the measure of individual well-being should respect the individual ideas about what is a 
good life. 
This principle immediately discards the use of so-called objective indices with weights that are a 
priori fixed by the analyst (or the policy maker). It also offers another perspective on the question of 
incommensurability of dimensions and on the position of the European Statistical System against 
indicator aggregation. Indeed, we agree with the European Statistical System that there is no good 
theoretical framework to aggregate the different dimensions at the global level when one follows 
the common approach of collecting the information dimension-by-dimension. Things change, 
however, when one first computes a measure of individual well-being (as advocated in Principle 2), 
and even more so if one accepts Principle 3. Throughout their lives, all individuals take decisions 
involving trade-offs between the different dimensions – and/or evaluate their lives in these terms. 
At the level of individual evaluation, the different dimensions of life are treated as commensurable. 
The construction of an individual measure of well-being is a necessary first step to arrive at a 
meaningful synthetic indicator of social progress.  
It is important to be explicit about the consequences of Principle 3. Using individual-specific weights 
implies that preferences play an essential role in the construction of the measure of individual well-
being. It is then possible that two individuals that are in exactly the same “objective” situation, i.e. 
reach the same value for all life dimensions, are ascribed a different level of well-being. To give an 
example: getting ill will have a stronger effect on the well-being of individual i than on the well-being 
of individual j if the former gives a relatively larger weight to health. Principle 3 has also 
consequences for the evaluation of developments over time: if an individual remains in exactly the 
same objective situation, but his preferences change, his well-being will be affected. There is indeed 
a deep conflict between “objective” approaches – applying the same weights for everyone – and 
“preference-based” approaches – respecting the life conceptions of the individuals themselves. 
                                                                
10
 When we talk about preferences in this paper, we refer to the individual conception of a good life. This 
Rawlsian concept includes the values and normative convictions of the individuals and should not be reduced 
to their mere egoistic self-interest, nor is it necessarily "revealed" in their choice behaviour. 
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Different citizens and analysts may take a different position in this respect. On the one hand it may 
look weird to speak about “social progress” if nothing has changed in the objective situation of a 
country, and only the preferences of the citizens have changed. On the other hand, it also looks 
weird to claim that two countries have experienced the same increase in well-being if the 
improvement has been in a dimension that is only considered relevant by one of them. In this paper 
we explore the possibility of an approach, reflecting Principle 3, but obviously other approaches are 
possible. 
Recently, happiness or life satisfaction measures have attracted much attention – typically based on 
survey questions of the type: “Everything considered, how satisfied are you with your life?” Similar 
questions have now been asked in dozens of surveys to thousands of respondents and the answers 
turn out to be robust.11 They show convincingly that life satisfaction does not only depend on 
material living conditions, but also on almost all dimensions enumerated in Table 1. If this is the 
case, and if we want to respect individual preferences, one may be tempted to simply use these 
satisfaction measures as indicators of individual well-being. Moreover, life satisfaction can be 
measured in a rather straightforward way. Are we – as observers – not complicating things 
unnecessarily by constructing a synthetic indicator of well-being ourselves, rather than leaving this 
to the responsibility of the respondents in a survey? Does social progress not ultimately consist in 
increasing happiness? 
In fact, measuring social progress in terms of the total happiness in the society boils down to a 
simple revival of traditional Benthamite utilitarianism. This is not the place to go into the everlasting 
philosophical debate on the pros and cons of utilitarianism, but we want to stress that measuring 
individual well-being in terms of subjective satisfaction does not respect personal preferences. This 
at first sight surprising insight is related to what Sen (1985) has called the problem of “physical-
condition neglect”: subjective satisfaction is grounded on the mental attitude of the person, and 
risks to neglect his or her real physical conditions. Subjective satisfaction is not only determined by 
objective characteristics of life and by opinions on what is a good life, but also by aspirations and 
expectations – and the latter adapt to the objective circumstances: “A person who is ill-fed, 
undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfillment 
if he or she has learned to have ‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small mercies” (Sen, 1985, 
p. 21). 
Physical-condition neglect and adaptation are not mere philosophical notes in the margin. The 
empirical literature on subjective satisfaction has shown that adaptation is a pervasive real-world 
phenomenon. The most striking examples are situated in the sphere of health. Countries with higher 
rates of HIV prevalence do not systematically report poorer life (or even health) satisfaction, yet 
individuals (and countries) care about HIV and prefer to have a lower rate (Deaton, 2008). 
Individuals who have lost a limb may, after adaptation, recover a good satisfaction score – but still 
express a strong aversion to disability (Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008). If one accepts (as we do) that 
                                                                
11
 To be precise, researchers still disagree about the relative importance of cognitive and affective components 
in the question and about the reliability of the questionnaire method (see, for example, Kahneman and 
Krueger, 2006). Various proposals have been made to measure social progress using subjective well-being 
measures such as life satisfaction and happiness. See, Veenhoven (1996) for an early proposal to compute a 
“happy life expectancy” (life expectancy times average happiness on a [0-1] scale). Recently, the World 
Happiness Report (Helliwell et al. 2013) provides a comparison of happiness across the world. 
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the poor and the ill are still poor and ill (and would prefer to be rich and healthy), even if they have 
learnt to embrace their lot, i.e., if one wants keep to our Principle 3, then subjective satisfaction 
cannot be taken as an adequate measure of overall well-being. Other ethical observers obviously 
may take a different position. This illustrates that choosing measures of individual well-being is 
ultimately a normative problem. 
Even if one accepts that subjective satisfaction cannot act as an encompassing measure of individual 
well-being, this does not imply that happiness is completely irrelevant. “It would be odd to claim 
that a person broken down by pain and misery is doing very well” (Sen, 1985, p. 17). Yet, feelings of 
subjective happiness or satisfaction are only part of the story. They can best be seen as one specific 
element in the vector of life dimensions. This is also the position taken by the European Statistical 
System and by the OECD (see Table 1). By virtue of Principle 3, the relative importance given to the 
dimension affective happiness may differ from individual to individual. In the light of the present 
debate and the growing popularity of measures of subjective satisfaction, it is good to formulate our 
position as a fourth principle:  
Principle 4 (Avoidance of physical-condition neglect). Happiness (or subjective life satisfaction) may 
be one of the important dimensions of life, but it should not be seen as an encompassing measure of 
individual well-being. 
The question remains open on how to implement Principles 3 and 4, now that we have discarded 
two popular approaches to measure well-being: objective measures with weights that are set a 
priori by the policy makers or the analysts and direct measures of subjective satisfaction. In the next 
section we will propose a new approach that is in some sense intermediate between these two 
extreme positions. Perhaps surprisingly, it will turn out that the empirical results on subjective 
satisfaction may still be very useful for the empirical implementation of this concept. 
AGGREGATION 2. CONSTRUCTING AN INDEX OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
Assume we have found a measure Wi representing the well-being of individual i. We still face the 
question of how to aggregate these values of Wi for the different individuals to arrive at an overall 
measure of social welfare, i.e. what weights to give to the different individual well-being levels. We 
share the opinion of the large majority of citizens in Western countries that this aggregation should 
be distribution-sensitive, i.e. that improvements in the well-being of the relatively worse-off should 
get a larger weight than improvements in the well-being of the better-off. This can be 
operationalized by introducing a parameter of inequality aversion in the calculation of social welfare. 
In broad lines, there are two possible approaches to set the value of this parameter of inequality 
aversion. The first approach takes it as an empirical fact – different citizens, groups or societies care 
to a different extent about inequality. However, using these observations as the basis for setting the 
parameter of inequality aversion in the calculation of social welfare just shifts the aggregation 
problem at another level: how then to aggregate different opinions about inequality? In our view, 
there is an even more basic ethical problem with this “empirical approach”. It would imply that 
inequality in society is no longer important if individuals did not care at all about others. We 
therefore follow a second approach, which is dominating in the philosophical literature. In that 
second approach, setting the parameter of inequality aversion is a normative choice. It is a question 
of justice, which cannot be settled by starting from individual preferences. The inequality aversion 
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parameter has to be introduced directly as a distributional characteristic at the collective level. The 
consequences of different opinions can then be analysed through a sensitivity analysis. Note that 
this approach does not create an inconsistency in our treatment of individual preferences. Our 
position that individual preferences should be respected when constructing an individual measure of 
well-being did not follow from these individual preferences themselves either, but was also based on 
a normative perspective and a specific view of justice.  
A natural way to introduce such a concern for inequality is to start from average well-being M and to 
penalize it by a measure of the inequality of its distribution 𝐼𝜌. Hence, we can write social welfare 
SW as 
(1)     𝑆𝑊 = 𝑀(1 − 𝐼𝜌). 
The inequality measure 𝐼𝜌 can be specified in different ways. One possibility (implemented in our 
empirical illustration) is to select 𝐼𝜌 from the so-called S-Gini family of inequality measures 
(Donaldson and Weymark, 1980), which defines inequality as a weighted average of the ratios of the 
well-being level Wi and M for each individual:  
(2)     𝐼𝜌 = 1 −  ∑ [(
𝑛 − 𝑖 + 1
𝑛
)
𝜌
− (
𝑛 − 𝑖
𝑛
)
𝜌
]
𝑊𝑖
𝑀
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
All individuals are ranked from worst-off to better-off, so that i reflects their position in the 
distribution. The weights for each individual are then given by the term between square brackets. 
These weights are larger for individuals with a lower position in the overall well-being distribution if 
ρ > 1. This parameter ρ, which can be interpreted as the degree of bottom sensitivity of the 
inequality index, offers a convenient way to capture differences in opinion on what justice requires. 
The pattern of weights attached to different positions in the income distribution for different values 
of ρ is shown in Figure 1. If  = 1, all individuals get the same weight in expression (2), i.e., 1/n, so 
that 𝐼𝜌 equals 0 for any distribution and expression (2) reduces to the simple average. If  goes to 
infinity, we give weight exclusively to the bottom of the distribution and expression (2) reduces to 1 
– W1 /M  so that expression (1) collapses to W1, the well-being of the worst-off.  This is the Rawlsian 
position. Intermediate values of  represent positions in between these two extremes. Figure 1 
shows the weights for the cases  = 5 and  = 2. Note that in the former case, individuals with an 
income above the median (percentile 50 and above) get a very small weight. The case  = 2 (with 
linearly declining weights) is particularly interesting, because the inequality measure in expression 
(2) then becomes the Gini coefficient. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
We summarize this brief discussion as: 
Principle 5 (Inequality aversion).  Justice requires to take into account the inequality among the 
individual indices of well-being. This can be done in a natural and flexible way by introducing an 
inequality aversion parameter in the social welfare function, implying that an improvement in the 
well-being of the relatively worse-off has a larger effect on social welfare than an improvement in the 
well-being of the relatively better of. Inequality aversion is a normative parameter, that is not 
necessarily related to individual preferences. 
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3. A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL: EQUIVALENT INCOMES 
In the previous section, we advocated a set of five basic principles that measures of individual well-
being and social welfare should satisfy. Neither subjective satisfaction nor the existing objective 
measures satisfy these principles. We will now propose a concept of well-being that does: the 
equivalent income.12 We first introduce the basic idea and then discuss how it can be 
operationalized. 
A. INTRODUCING EQUIVALENT INCOMES 
We start from  a situation (see Figure 2) in which two individuals agree on what is a good life. Both 
Ann and Bob prefer Ann's life (in A) to Bob's life (in B). In this case, Principle 3 requires us to accept 
that the well-being of Ann is greater than that of Bob. Note that this does not imply that Ann is 
necessarily happier than Bob. It is very possible that Ann comes from a rich family and has a long 
experience of being healthy – while Bob’s situation may have improved considerably compared to 
that of his deprived parents. The aspirations of Ann may then be much more ambitious – and she 
therefore may feel worse off than Bob, despite the fact that she would not be willing to change 
position with him. This is precisely a situation of adaptation of satisfaction to aspirations, as was 
described in the previous section.  
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
The comparison between Ann and Bob in Figure 2 is relatively straightforward. The more challenging 
(but also more realistic) case is one in which both individuals have different ideas about what is 
important in life, i.e., they have different preferences. In Figure 3, Ann and Bob disagree on the good 
life, which can be seen from their crossing indifference curves. Bob (in situation B) would in fact 
prefer to be in the situation of Ann, but at the same time Ann would prefer to be in the situation of 
Bob. How are we going to say which of the two individuals is worse or better off in such a case of 
mutual envy?  
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
Let us recall our starting point: the choice of a well-being measure is not a metaphysical or a 
psychological question, but rather an ethical or political one. When we claim that Ann is better off 
than Bob, this means that someone who is concerned about inequality is justified to draw the 
conclusion that redistribution from Ann to Bob would be an improvement from the social point of 
view. Whereas it is common to think of redistribution in terms of income, it is not straightforward – 
or even possible – to redistribute health (or outcomes in other dimensions of life). Hence, a natural 
question to ask at this point is the following: under what conditions can we reduce the multiple 
dimensions of well-being to the income dimension only, i.e., under what conditions is it possible to 
                                                                
12
 We face a danger of terminological confusion here. The term “equivalent income” is commonly used to 
indicate the “income corrected by using an equivalence scale” (mainly to take account of differences in 
household composition). Although closely related, this does not perfectly coincide with the interpretation we 
will give to the concept. However, this latter interpretation also has a long tradition, and the term is explicitly 
used at least since the work of King (1983) – see Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) for a sketch of the historical 
background. In the light of that literature it would be equally confusing not to use the term “equivalent 
income” in this paper. We therefore prefer to stick to it, but warn the reader for the possible confusion.   
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state that a redistribution of income from Ann to Bob would indeed lead to a more equal 
distribution of well-being, or, equivalently, that Ann is better off than Bob if her income is larger? 
This is obviously not true in general. In Figure 3 there is no a priori reason to say that Ann is better 
off in situation A than Bob is in situation B. She is indeed richer, but at the same time she is also less 
healthy. 
Now consider a situation in which Ann and Bob have the same suboptimal health. Even then, it is not 
straightforward to compare their well-being on the basis of their income alone, since one individual 
may care more about being sick than the other. Figure 3 illustrates. Suppose that both Ann and Bob 
were in the same situation X, in which they are equally (un)healthy and also have the same income. 
However, as shown by the crossing indifference curves, Ann and Bob have different ideas about 
what is important in life. Indeed, as the indifference curve of Ann is steeper compared to the 
indifference curve of Bob, health is relatively more important for her than it is for Bob. In other 
words, Ann is willing to give up more income for an improvement in her health. Applying Principle 3 
then suggests that her level of well-being is lower.  
Let us therefore go one step further and consider a situation in which two individuals are not only 
equally healthy, they are in addition both perfectly healthy. Such a situation is represented in Figure 
3 if we were to compare situations A’ and B’. We suggest that in such a comparison between two 
individuals who are perfectly healthy, the individual with the largest income can be seen as better 
off. In other words, it seems natural to state that differences in the weight given to health by 
different individuals become irrelevant if they are both in perfect health. Take the individual in B’ 
who has the highest income. Can he legitimately claim that he is worse-off than someone in A’ with 
a smaller income, because he cares less about being healthy? 
While we focused our example in Figures 2 and 3 on combinations of income and health, the 
reasoning also extends naturally to other non-income dimensions. From the previous discussion,  
two basic intuitions can be distilled. First, if we want to respect individual ideas about what is a good 
life, two situations that are seen by the individual as equally good also correspond to the same level 
of well-being for policy analysis. Second, if all individuals obtain their most preferred situation on a 
non-income dimension, the importance given to this dimension should not influence the ranking of 
their well-being. Obviously, these intuitions reflect normative positions, which should be judged on 
the basis of their ethical acceptability. Certainly the second one is debatable.13 However, once we 
accept them, we can immediately derive an interesting concept of individual well-being that can be 
made operational. This is the equivalent income. 
Say that we want to compare the well-being of Ann in situation A with the well-being of Bob in B as 
they are depicted in Figure 3. Our first intuition implies that Ann reaches the same level of well-
being in situation A and in A’ and that Bob reaches the same level of well-being in situation B and B’. 
Our second intuition implies that A’ and B’ can be ranked on the basis of income only – these 
incomes are denoted in the figure as equivalent income (for Ann in) A and equivalent income (for 
Bob in) B. These equivalent incomes measure the well-being levels of the two individuals. In this 
                                                                
13
 The second principle is not necessary to support the idea of equivalent income. Equivalent incomes can be 
calculated for any choice of reference values of the non-income dimensions (see, for example, Fleurbaey et al., 
2009). However, the choice of the “best” value as reference is an attractive choice. See Fleurbaey and Blanchet 
(2013) for an extensive discussion. 
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case, it turns out that Ann is worse off in A than Bob is in B, despite the fact that Ann is richer. The 
reason is clear: in situation A, Ann has a lower level of health and health is relatively important for 
her. In more general and abstract terms, we can define the equivalent income as follows.  
Definition (Equivalent income). The equivalent income of an individual is the hypothetical income 
that, if combined with the best possible value on all non-income dimensions, would place the 
individual in a situation that he/she finds equally good as his/her actual situation.  
Note that the equivalent income crucially depends on the individual ideas about what is a good life. 
We discussed this already when we introduced Principle 3. If both Ann and Bob were in the same 
situation X, the equivalent income of Ann would still be lower because she suffers more from poor 
health. In addition, equivalent income has all the pleasant operational features of monetary income. 
It can easily be interpreted in cardinal terms and can be used without any problem in the 
computation of social welfare and inequality according to expressions (1) and (2). In fact, the 
difference between Ann’s income in A and her equivalent income simply is her willingness-to-pay for 
perfect health. To some, the use of a monetary measure may seem to imply a return to the money 
fetishism that we wanted to leave behind us when going beyond GDP. These feelings are 
understandable, but they are misplaced. As the example illustrates, the ranking of well-being in 
terms of equivalent incomes may be very different from the income ranking. What really matters is 
not the monetary measurement, but the assumption of commensurability, i.e., the basic idea that it 
is meaningful to define trade-offs between the different dimensions and that the correct way to 
make these trade-offs is to respect the ideas on the good life held by the individuals themselves. 
Note also that the equivalent income is always lower than the actual monetary income, unless the 
individual reaches the best possible level for all non-income dimensions. This has a very natural 
interpretation: the difference between the equivalent and the actual income reflects the decrease in 
well-being that results from not reaching these best possible levels, and this decrease is measured in 
money terms. Of course, this also implies that adding additional non-income dimensions necessarily 
lowers the equivalent income. This may seem counterintuitive if one tries to compare the values of 
well-being for different definitions of the vector of non-income dimensions. Yet, such comparisons 
do not make much sense. Different vectors of life dimensions imply psychologically and socially 
different concepts of well-being, and the resulting calculated values cannot be compared in a 
meaningful way.   
B. COMPUTING EQUIVALENT INCOMES 
To compute equivalent incomes, we need information about the position of (a representative 
sample of) all individuals in society on a given list of relevant life dimensions. In addition, we also 
need information about their preferences, i.e., about the individual weights given to these different 
dimensions. Promising results have been found in three directions. 
First, for those dimensions about which individuals have some choice, their preferences can be 
revealed by observed behavior, if we are willing to assume that their choices are based on correct 
information. The most straightforward application here is with labor market data (Bargain et al., 
2013). Second, since the difference between income and equivalent income equals the individual 
willingness-to-pay to be in the best possible situation on the non-income dimensions, well-known 
stated preference techniques such as contingent valuation can be used as well. Equivalent incomes 
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have been calculated with this technique by Fleurbaey et al. (2013). A third method, starting from 
information about life satisfaction, has been applied by Fleurbaey et al. (2009) and, for the specific 
case of job characteristics, by Schokkaert et al. (2011). One of its main advantages is that it can be 
easily implemented with data from a survey that contains individual information about life 
dimensions and about life satisfaction. Since this is the method that will be applied in our own 
empirical application in this paper, we will discuss it in some more detail. 
It may seem surprising that we have rejected life satisfaction as a synthetic indicator of well-being 
and nevertheless use it to calculate equivalent incomes. However, it is possible to distinguish 
between two sources of information that are present in satisfaction questions. First, they give 
information about the level of satisfaction of the individual. We argued above that this information 
on satisfaction levels may be influenced by aspirations and expectations and should therefore not be 
used as a synthetic well-being indicator. Second, if we accept the reasonable assumption that the 
relative importance respondents attach to the different life dimensions is reflected in their overall 
judgment, then we can derive from their answers useful information about the shape of the 
indifference curves in Figures 2 and 3. In fact, the approach of deriving willingness-to-pay from 
empirical regressions of subjective satisfaction is a popular one (see, for instance, Clark and Oswald, 
2002). It is exactly this second source of information that can be used to compute equivalent 
incomes.14 
Call yi the income of individual i, xi the vector of relevant non-income dimensions of life, zi a vector of 
personal characteristics that are not part of the relevant dimensions of life, such as gender, age and 
country of origin, and Si her life satisfaction. The satisfaction of individual i can then be written as:  
(3)     𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + (𝜇 + 𝜋
′𝑧𝑖)𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 + (𝛽 + 𝛾′𝑧𝑖)’𝑓(𝑥𝑖) + 𝛿
′𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝜀𝑖  is a disturbance term and the decreasing returns of each of the non-income life dimensions 
are captured by the Box-Cox transformations 
(4)     𝑓(𝑣𝑖) =
𝑣𝑖
𝜏−1
𝜏
. 
When the transformation parameter 𝜏 equals 1, the transformation of the dimension is linear. The 
smaller the parameter, the larger the concavity of the transformation and the larger the degree of 
decreasing returns of the considered dimension on life satisfaction. When 𝜏 goes to 0, the 
transformation function becomes the logarithm. The coefficients to be estimated are the scalars  
and μ, and the vectors ( 𝜋, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜏).15 
An increase in income and in the relevant life dimensions x increases satisfaction. An increase in z 
also affects satisfaction, but since z does not include relevant dimensions of life, we interpret it as 
                                                                
14
 Interestingly, in this approach of retrieving opinions on the good life from subjective life satisfaction 
regressions, there is an echo of the conclusion of Diener and Suh (1997 p. 214) in their comparison of 
economics, social and subjective indicators of quality of life: “[A] complete understanding of objective 
indicators and how to select them requires that we understand people’s values, and have knowledge about 
how objective indicators influence people’s experience of well-being”.  
15
 A more flexible model, which relaxes the assumption 𝜏𝑦 = 0 and allows for a flexible Box-Cox 
transformation of the income dimension, is feasible but unnecessarily complicates the mathematical 
expressions for the equivalent income in the following. As will become clear below, the simplifying assumption 
of a logarithmic transformation of income is not rejected by our data.  
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capturing aspirations and expectations. Note that some of these individual characteristics are also 
influencing the effect of income and the other quality dimensions x through an interaction effect. 
This interaction effect allows us to account for the possibility that individuals with different personal 
characteristics may have different ideas about what is important in life. Of course, how strong this 
effect is and in which direction it goes is an empirical matter. 
Recall that the equivalent income is defined as the hypothetical income that, if combined with the 
best possible value on all non-income dimensions, would place the individual in a situation that he or 
she finds equally good as his or her initial situation. If we indicate these best possible values by ?̅? and 
the equivalent income of individual i by 𝑦𝑖
∗, we can write: 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + (𝜇 + 𝜋
′𝑧𝑖)𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 + (𝛽 + 𝛾′𝑧𝑖)’𝑓(𝑥𝑖) + 𝛿
′𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 = 
𝛼 + (𝜇 + 𝜋′𝑧𝑖)𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖
∗ + (𝛽 + 𝛾′𝑧𝑖)’𝑓(?̅?) + 𝛿
′𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
and therefore 
(5)     𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝 ⌈(
𝛽 + 𝛾′𝑧𝑖
𝜇 + 𝜋′𝑧𝑖
) ′(𝑓(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑓(?̅?))⌉ 
This expression is intuitive. The equivalent income will increase with 𝑥𝑖 and the size of that increase 
is determined by the relative importance of 𝑥𝑖 as compared to income.
16 If the individual reaches the 
best possible value 𝑥 ̅ for all dimensions, the equivalent income becomes equal to the actual income 
(see also Figure 3). Personal characteristics 𝑧𝑖  enter the expression (5) in so far as they affect the 
relative importance given by individual i to the various dimensions of life. By construction 
differences in aspirations (as captured by the coefficients ) do not have an effect on equivalent 
income, nor do the idiosyncratic differences captured in the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖 . 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION  
To compute equivalent incomes for various European countries, we use the European Social Survey 
(ESS). The ESS is designed to chart the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the 
attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its citizens. Since 2002, data has been collected every two 
years in more than thirty nations. For our purposes it is a useful data set as it contains information 
on a number of life dimensions and on life satisfaction. We focus on 2008 and 2010 (waves 4 and 5) 
of the survey. We do so for two reasons. First, this allows us to study the development of well-being 
during the turbulent period of the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis.17 Second, in wave 4 the 
ESS method of collecting household income information has been considerably improved, which 
complicates comparisons with the earlier three waves. 
                                                                
16
 As in all regression analyses, changing the scale of the x-variables will also change the scale of the estimated 
coefficients. These should therefore be interpreted cautiously. However, as eq. (5) shows, it is the product 
(𝛽 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑖)′𝑓(𝑥𝑖) that appears in eq. (5). Therefore, changes in the scaling of the independent variables will not 
affect the calculated equivalent incomes. 
17
 As the survey was organized at the end of the calendar year, it is supposed to describe the situation of the 
individuals in 2008 and 2010. 
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Yet, the ESS is not the ideal data set to compute equivalent incomes.18 First, the income information 
in the ESS is rather crude and based on a single question. Household heads report their total 
household income by indicating the income decile to which they belong.19 Second, the ESS is a 
repeated cross-section and not a panel survey, which makes it difficult to control for individual-
specific time-invariant characteristics in the life satisfaction regression. It is well-known, for example, 
that personality traits are important determinants of life satisfaction and that not controlling for 
them may lead to biased estimates of the other coefficients (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 
2004). 
In Table 4 we summarize the life dimensions that are included in our analysis and how they are 
measured in the European Social Survey. A comparison with Table 1 shows that most of the 
dimensions listed by the European Statistical System are included, except Education, Natural and 
living environment, Experience of life and Governance and basic rights.20 We return below to the 
question why we did not include education as a life dimension. 
 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for each of these variables for the 18 countries considered in our 
analysis. We include countries for which we have data on the key variables in both waves, leaving us 
with 15 EU-members and Switzerland, Norway and the Russian Federation.21 The third column of 
Table 5 provides the average responses on the life-satisfaction question: “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Answers range from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) 
to 10 (extremely satisfied). Denmark (DK) stands out as the country with highest average life 
satisfaction and Hungary (HU) and the Russian Federation (RU) score lowest. By virtue of the 
uprating procedure described in Appendix 1, the average incomes in column four coincide with the 
Real Net National Incomes time series reported by the OECD. Norway (NO) is the richest country and 
                                                                
18
 Within the European context, alternative data sets to compute equivalent incomes are the Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC), the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), and the 
European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) (Eurofound, 2012). The available SILC data do not contain a life 
satisfaction question and do not allow to estimate preferences. The SILC 2013 contains an ad-hoc module on 
well-being, but at the moment of writing these data were not yet available. The SHARE data only cover the 
population that is 50 years and older. Interestingly however, the latter data set includes also a set of so-called 
anchoring vignettes that allow to correct for scale heterogeneity in self-evaluations of life satisfaction (see 
Angelini et al. 2012). 
19
 The country and time-specific cut-offs of these income deciles are taken from an external source. After 
converting the reported deciles to their corresponding monetary values (by taking the midpoint of each 
interval), some discrepancies remain between the ranking of the countries according to the average income in 
the survey and the well-established macro-figures. In addition, corrections for price differences have to be 
made to allow for comparisons between countries. Therefore we apply an uprating procedure of all incomes 
such that the country average total household income per capita coincides with the “Real net national income 
at the price levels and PPPs of 2005” as provided by the OECD on 28/1/2013. Appendix 1 provides more 
details.  
20
 “Experience of life” and in particular happiness, could in principle be included in the analysis, as the ESS also 
includes a happiness question “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?”. We have 
decided not to take this variable as a dimension of life because of its very high correlation with life satisfaction. 
This common finding may hint at the confusion between the evaluative question on life satisfaction and the 
affective question on happiness. See also Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013). 
21
 Countries included in the analysis are Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), 
Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Russian Federation (RU), Sweden (SE) and Slovenia (SI). 
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Hungary the poorest. Column five describes the health situation of the respondents, measured by 
their self-assessed health. Although self-assessed health is a good predictor of, for example, 
mortality, caution is needed with international comparisons (see Jürges, 2007). On average, citizens 
in Greece (GR) are most healthy. Unemployment rates are given in column six, with notable 
increases in unemployment figures between 2008 and 2010 for Spain (ES) and Greece. The next 
column presents average social interactions scores measured on a 1 to 7 scale. Lowest scores are 
obtained by the former communist countries (see also Howard, 2002). Column eight presents the 
average feeling of safety on a 1 to 4 scale, where lower numbers indicate countries that are more 
unsafe, such as Russia and Greece. Switzerland (CH) and, again, Norway perform best on this 
dimension. The final three columns present the occurrence of some socio-demographic 
characteristics in the sample: being younger than 48, being female or having enjoyed higher 
education.  
[insert Table 6 about here] 
As described above, the first step to compute equivalent incomes involves the estimation of the life 
satisfaction equation (3). After pooling observations across all countries and both waves, we obtain a 
data set  with about 52,000 observations. We use an ordered logit estimation to account for the 
ordinal nature of the responses on the life satisfaction questions.22 Table 6 presents the coefficients 
that are necessary to compute equivalent incomes. In this estimation we include various control 
variables to capture aspirations and expectations of the respondents such as their household size, 
education, education (squared), gender, age, age (squared), marital status, dummies for being 
religious, urban, belonging to an ethnic minority, and a time and country dummy. The coefficients 
obtained for these control variables all stand to reason, but are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
In the first row of Table 6, one finds the coefficient of logarithm of income of an individual in the 
reference group (who is older than 48, male and without higher education).23 This coefficient (µ in 
expression (4)) is 0.375 and significant at the 0.1% level. The non-income dimensions are presented 
in the next rows. The dimension-specific Box-Cox transformation parameters are determined to 
maximize the overall fit of the model (Box and Cox 1964). Among the non-income dimensions, the 
decreasing returns are found to be largest for social interactions (τ = 0.34) and smallest for safety (τ 
= 0.95). Individuals in the reference group who are healthier report higher life satisfaction, whereas 
the unemployed report a lower life satisfaction. More social interactions and feelings of better 
personal safety are also associated with higher life satisfaction.  
The method based on a life satisfaction regression cannot provide individual-specific coefficients for 
the dimensions of life. At best we can account for the heterogeneity between broad socio-
demographic groups. The interaction effects (π) are given in the final six rows of Table 6.24 We find 
that women and higher educated individuals have a higher coefficient of income. The young and 
higher educated care less about their health, women care less than men about being unemployed 
                                                                
22
 Estimating the same equation with ordinary least squares leads to very similar results.  
23
 A more flexible procedure with a Box-Cox transformation for income leads to an estimate of the 
transformation coefficient τy = - 0.01. This is indeed very close to 0, supporting the choice of the logarithmic 
transformation (see also Layard et al. 2008). 
24
 We started from the full set of 15 possible interaction effects between the five dimensions and the three 
considered socio-demographic variables, and then we have dropped consecutively the least significant terms 
until reaching the presented parsimonious model with all remaining interactions significant at the 10% level. 
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and about safety (but both dimensions remain important for them).25 Even with our crude method, 
we already find quite some disagreement on the relative importance of the dimensions of life. This 
finding makes Principle 3 also empirically relevant. 
The final necessary ingredient for the computation of the equivalent incomes involves the choice of 
the best possible values in each of the non-monetary dimensions of life (?̅?). In general, these “best” 
possible values will depend on the preferences of the individuals.26 However, for the dimensions 
taken up in our analysis the choice is easy since the variable used to measure the outcomes of the 
individuals is bounded and the respondents express a clear and unanimous opinion on what is the 
best value. To be precise, we select “very good” as best value for the health dimension. Not being 
unemployed is selected as the best value in the unemployment dimension, meeting every day with 
friends is the best value for the social interaction dimension and not feeling unsafe the best value for 
the personal safety dimension. 
Education has a positive but small effect on life satisfaction (not reported). This low economic 
significance of education is in line with, for example, the results in Fleurbaey et al. (2009). Arguably, 
the education variable affects life satisfaction in two ways. First, it can be considered as  a relevant 
dimension of well-being. Fixing its best value is not obvious, however, since being better educated is 
– at least theoretically – not naturally bounded and, more importantly, it is not reasonable to 
assume that the best value for education is uniform for everyone. On the other hand, it can also be 
argued that education affects expectations and aspirations and should therefore rather be seen as 
part of the vector zi of conditioning variables. The problem is that our technique of estimating 
preferences through a life satisfaction regression does not allow us to disentangle these two effects 
empirically.27 Each variable has to be classified in one and only one category (it is either a life 
dimension xi or a personal characteristic zi). We have opted to treat education not as a life 
dimension, but as a variable influencing aspirations. We performed a sensitivity analysis, however. 
Given the rather small direct effect of education on life satisfaction, taking it up in the calculation of 
equivalent incomes does not change any of our substantial results. 
5. WELL-BEING AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN EUROPE 
The criterion proposed in this paper to evaluate well-being while taking the various life dimensions 
and inequality into account is given by expression (1). Social welfare is measured by SW, progress 
(regress) is measured by changes in SW. These results will be given in Tables 10-12. To facilitate the 
interpretation of these results, we first focus on average equivalent incomes and on inequality 
separately. Table 7 summarizes the main results for the average equivalent incomes. The first two 
columns present the results for 2008, the third and the fourth column those for 2010 and the two 
                                                                
25
 The result about safety may seem surprising. One possible explanation is that our “safety”-variable basically 
measures feelings of unsafety. If these “feelings” are different for males and females (in that females feel more 
unsafe in similar neighbourhoods) this may have an effect on the estimated coefficient. However, this is not a 
problem for the calculation of equivalent incomes, since in this calculation the stronger feelings of unsafety 
among women will be captured by the observed values of 𝑓(𝑥𝑖). 
26
 See also the theoretical analysis in Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013). 
27
 The problem does not occur with the other two methods of estimating preferences. Since each of these 
methods has its own weak and strong points, it would certainly be advisable to compare the results obtained 
with each of them. At this moment, however, there is no data set that allows us to do so. 
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last columns show the yearly growth rates. In each case we give the results for monetary incomes 
and for equivalent incomes with the full list of dimensions summarized in Table 4. 
[insert Table 7 about here] 
The first column presents the average monetary incomes for 2008. With our data, the average 
income coincides with the “real net national income” macro variable. The ranking of the countries is 
given in italics. Norway is the richest country in our sample, followed by the Netherlands and 
Sweden. Hungary is the poorest country. The second column gives the average level of the 
equivalent incomes with all dimensions included. In 2008 the highest average equivalent income was 
reached by Norway, Denmark and Switserland, while the citizens of Russia, Hungary, Estonia and 
Poland were worst-off on average. As discussed before, adding dimensions necessarily lowers 
equivalent incomes (except in the unrealistic case in which all citizens of a country reach the best 
possible value for all the added dimensions). Therefore it is not meaningful to compare the values 
across columns. What is meaningful, is a comparison of the rankings of the countries within and 
across columns. The most striking differences between the two rankings are the worsening of the 
position of Germany (DE) and the Netherlands and the improvement of the position of Denmark. 
Below we return to the interpretation of these shifts.  
The situation in 2010 (in the third and fourth column of Table 7) is very similar. This is reassuring, as 
we should not expect large structural changes in these average levels over a period of only two 
years. The last two columns of Table 7 show yearly growth rates between 2008 and 2010. With the 
exception of three countries (Germany, Poland and, most outspokenly, Switzerland) all countries 
suffered from negative growth rates when only income is considered as a dimension of life. In 
particular, Estonia and Greece were heavily hit by the financial crisis and the effects of a bursting 
real estate market bubble (in Estonia) and a government debt crisis (in Greece). The changes in 
average well-being are different however. In Belgium, Spain, Slovenia and (especially) Sweden and 
Russia the negative income growth goes together with an improvement in average well-being. For 
Germany, the development of average well-being is also more positive than that of income. On the 
other hand, the growth performance in terms of well-being is worse than that in terms of income for 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and France. It is also interesting to compare the two countries with an 
extremely negative income growth: Estonia and Greece. While the Estonian performance improves a 
little when adding other dimensions, the Greek situation gets even worse. Growth in well-being is 
largest (and positive) in Sweden, Switzerland, Russia, and Germany – it is lowest (and strongly 
negative) in Greece, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and France. 
Interpreting  the changes of the equivalent incomes is complicated by the presence of composition 
effects. Suppose, for instance, that the average health level in a country improves, but that this 
average increase results from an improvement in the health of individuals that care less about 
healthy (for example the young) while at the same time the health of individuals that care more 
worsens. The average equivalent incomes may then decrease, even if average health in the country 
increases. Accounting for such compositional effects is one of the main objectives of our approach. 
[insert Table 8 about here] 
Despite this caveat, it is useful to look at the relative importance of the different dimensions. This 
information is shown in Table 8 for 2008 (results for 2010 are very similar and not reported). The 
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first column gives average monetary incomes and coincides with the first column in Table 7. The 
sixth column shows average equivalent incomes with all the dimensions included and coincides with 
the second column in Table 7. The columns in between present the hypothetical equivalent incomes 
when each time only one dimension is included (in addition to income). In other words, the third 
column presents the average equivalent incomes when income and health are seen as life 
dimensions, the next column presents average equivalent incomes when income and unemployment 
are treated as life dimensions, and so on. This makes it possible to evaluate the effect of each of the 
dimensions in separation. The right hand part of Table 8 gives for each of the dimensions separately 
and (in the last column) for all dimensions together the difference in percentages between average 
income and the respective values of average equivalent income (i.e. well-being). As noted before, 
introducing an additional dimension necessarily lowers the measure of well-being.  
Health turns out to have the largest effect on equivalent incomes. It gets a large weight in the 
preferences, and many respondents suffer from health problems. Very strong effects of ill-health are 
found for the East European countries and, more surprisingly, for Germany and the Netherlands. 
Greece, on the contrary, has a healthy population. To interpret these results correctly, it is important 
to keep in mind that we measure health by self-assessed health. Based on the SHARE data set  (a 
representative sample of the elderly), Jürges (2007) has found that precisely for the Germans and 
the Dutch there seems to be some discrepancy between these subjective indicators and objective 
health information. Yet, from the perspective of measuring well-being it is an open question 
whether self-assessed health does not contain relevant information that is missing in the objective 
data. The second most important dimension is the quality of social interactions. Including social 
interactions has the smallest effect on equivalent incomes in Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Norway. In these countries social interactions seem to be reasonably good. The (lack of) quality of 
social interactions has a strongly negative effect in Greece and Hungary. Feelings of safety are 
somewhat less important. The result for unemployment is striking: increasing unemployment has a 
rather minor effect on average well-being, mainly because it only hits the unemployed 
subpopulation. The largest negative effects are found in Greece, Hungary and Spain. 
The relative importance of all the dimensions together can be read from the last column. The smaller 
the absolute value of the negative numbers in that column, the better the relative performance of 
that country in terms of the non-income dimensions. Good performers are Switzerland, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. Poor performing countries are Estonia, Hungary and Russia.  
Let us now look at the inequality in our well-being measure. Table 9 presents the results for 2008 
and 2010. We compare the inequality in equivalent incomes with traditional income inequality for 
two values of ρ. When ρ is set equal to 2, we obtain the Gini coefficient. The value ρ = 5 corresponds 
to a larger degree of bottom-sensitivity, i.e., a stronger focus on what happens to the people with 
the lowest (equivalent) incomes. Since the picture is rather similar for 2008 and 2010, we focus on 
the former year. 
The first column of Table 9 gives the results for the inequality in money incomes.28  Again we present 
the ranks in italics, but now higher ranks reflect more unequal countries – a lower rank therefore 
indicates a preferred situation. The Czech Republic and the Scandinavian countries have the most 
                                                                
28
 As the income data in the European Social Survey are not perfect, the Gini coefficients in Table 9 do not 
correspond perfectly to the Gini coefficients obtained from macro data (see Appendix 1). 
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equal income distribution. Income inequality is largest in Great Britain, Switzerland, Poland and 
Russia. The second column of Table 9 shows the inequality in well-being. The most striking fact is the 
spectacular increase in inequality for all countries, indicating the phenomenon of cumulative 
deprivation. Inequality in other dimensions does not compensate for income inequality, but 
increases overall inequality considerably. There are also shifts in the relative positions of the 
countries. The Scandinavian countries remain at the top, but for other countries the differences are 
quite dramatic. Switzerland and Great Britain, for instance, are (relative to other countries) less 
unequal in equivalent incomes compared to standard incomes (although the inequality in Great 
Britain remains high with equivalent incomes also). The Eastern European countries (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia) are relatively to the other countries more unequal when 
we include the non-income dimensions in our measure of well-being. 
[insert Table 9 about here] 
We can now construct the overall distribution-sensitive measure of social welfare by combining in a 
multiplicative way the information on average (equivalent) incomes as given in Table 7 with the 
information on inequality from Table 9. These results are presented in Table 10 and Table 11 for 
2008 and 2010 respectively. The yearly growth rates are shown in Table 12. The columns with  = 1 
repeat the corresponding results for the averages, since  = 1 corresponds to the utilitarian 
perspective that focuses only on average equivalent income. We include them nevertheless for the 
sake of comparison. This comparison immediately yields a surprising result. Introducing distribution-
sensitivity does indeed change the relative ranking of some countries, but these changes are rather 
minor and they are more outspoken when we only focus on income compared to the situation in 
which we also include the other dimensions. The explanation is that the relative differences in the 
averages are much larger for equivalent incomes than for traditional incomes (compare the columns 
with  = 1) and therefore the differences in M have a much larger effect on social welfare, as given 
by equation (1).  This suggests that the intercountry differences when moving from incomes to 
equivalent incomes are mainly driven by the average levels. This is indeed what we find. Some 
countries do considerably better in terms of equivalent incomes than in terms of incomes: 
Switzerland, Denmark, Poland, even Greece. Some do worse: Germany and the Netherlands.  
[insert Table 10 and Table 11 about here] 
Looking at the country rankings for social welfare as defined in equation (1), i.e., the right hand part 
of Table 10 and Table 11, we obtain the (unsurprising) result that social welfare is largest in the 
Scandinavian countries and in Switzerland, followed by Great Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Note that Great Britain does relatively worse when we strengthen the concern for the poor, i.e., 
increase the bottom-sensitivity in our inequality measure. Social welfare is lowest in the Eastern 
European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, and Russia). 
Finally, in Table 12, we show the yearly growth rate in social welfare. Note that there are large 
differences between the country ranking based on growth figures and the ranking based on the 
overall level of well-being reached. Since we have commented already on the differences between 
average income growth and average growth in well-being (the numbers given in the columns with  
= 1), we will now focus on the effect of increasing the weight given to the worst-off in the right hand 
part of the table. Some countries do much better when we evaluate their performance with a social 
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welfare function that gives a larger weight to distributional issues: Belgium and Hungary. Some do 
worse: Germany and Spain. Moreover, the growth results for Spain are deeply negative and we 
observe a really dramatic negative development in Greece (up to -25%). The financial crisis has 
obviously been especially severe for the worst-off groups in countries as Spain and Greece and this 
comes out most prominently when looking at a rich measure of well-being in a distribution-sensitive 
way.  
[insert Table 12 about here] 
So far we have focused on inter-country comparisons. Alternatively, one can zoom in on specific 
countries. Yet, this perspective requires ideally an in-depth analysis accounting for the compositional 
effects due to the different trends of the outcomes for socioeconomic groups with different 
preferences. Let us nevertheless give two examples. The first is Greece. Although subjective health in 
Greece is above average, it is low in the ranking of average equivalent incomes both in 2008 and in 
2010. Between these two years it had the largest negative growth in equivalent incomes (-9.04%). 
When including distributional considerations its growth rate becomes even more negative, as the 
worst-off in the Greek society are hit most severely. We pointed already to the dramatic social 
regress between 2008 and 2010 for a bottom-sensitive social welfare function.  
A second example is Germany. Its overall ranking in terms of well-being is less favorable than its 
ranking in terms of income. This is mainly due to a worse score for subjective health (with the 
caveats mentioned above). Moreover, Germany has a larger inequality, both in incomes and in well-
being. Between 2008 and 2010 it had positive growth rates when we only consider incomes or 
average well-being – it had negative growth in well-being when we take the distribution into 
account. This is especially true for a social welfare function with an outspoken concern for the 
weakest groups in society. It is not very meaningful to look in this way at all the countries, nor should 
one forget the relative fragility of our data set. It seems clear, nevertheless, that the notion of well-
being can be made operational in an attractive way. 
6. CONCLUSION 
With this paper we illustrated that it is possible to calculate measures of the level of well-being and 
its inequality in a coherent way by making use of data that can easily be collected with a 
representative questionnaire study. This is not to say that our empirical results are beyond doubt. 
Let us therefore state clearly the four different levels in our reasoning.   
At a first level, one finds the basic principles. Two ideas are especially important. In our view, a 
satisfactory index of social well-being has to account for the fact that the weights attached to the 
different dimensions may not be the same across different individuals. Moreover, the construction 
of a synthetic index of well-being is desirable. Such a synthetic index is needed to capture the 
important phenomenon of cumulative deprivation. Of course, other observers may have different 
ethical views, e.g., on the importance of subjective happiness. There is room for debate, but this 
debate should focus on the ethical foundation of the principles, rather than on the empirical 
implementation. 
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At a second level, we proposed the idea of equivalent income. To the best of our knowledge, 
equivalent income is the most attractive measure of well-being satisfying our basic principles. Its 
main weakness is the justification of the reference values. 
Equivalent incomes can be operationalized with different techniques. This is the third level. In this 
paper we applied the subjective satisfaction method, but this method has its weaknesses. It can only 
capture group-wise differences in preferences (and not the differences between individuals) and it 
has difficulties to distinguish between the well-being and the aspirational effects of specific 
variables. Moreover subjective variables (such as self-assessed health) are in general more strongly 
correlated with life satisfaction than objective variables. Certainly when one cannot sufficiently 
correct for endogeneity, subjective variables then will tend to be overweighted in the calculation of 
equivalent incomes. This is a main issue. In the future, the results with different techniques should 
be compared and put together to get a more robust picture of well-being. 
Finally, at the lowest level, we situate our own empirical application with data from the European 
Social Survey in 2008 and 2010. These data are far from perfect and therefore our empirical results 
should interpreted cautiously. What is important, however, is to realize that measuring well-being 
taking multiple life dimensions and inequality into account is possible.  
We have built into our exercise the possibility of different degrees of inequality aversion – ranging 
from completely disregarding inequality at one extreme to looking only at the poorest at the other 
extreme. Sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter allows for an open debate about its 
implications. The idea of sensitivity analysis can be exploited further. More specifically, it would be 
interesting to build in a sensitivity analysis with respect to the life dimensions that are included in 
the measurement exercise. As a matter of fact, if one includes affective happiness as one of the life 
dimensions, the happiness approach can be integrated in the sensitivity analysis in a convenient 
way. A precondition for this is the development of robust measures of satisfaction that make it 
possible to distinguish its cognitive and affective components. 
We have emphasized throughout this paper that the choice of a well-being measure for policy 
evaluation is an ethical and political question. Normative views may diverge, and it is therefore 
meaningful to compare and discuss the results obtained with different approaches. This should 
result in a political debate about the content of the arguments within a coherent theory of justice. 
Justice remains important in society even if only a minority of the population care about it. Our claim 
that individual preferences about life dimensions should be respected is an ethical position and is 
not based on these individual preferences themselves. It is crucial to distinguish these two layers in 
all discussions about measuring well-being and social progress.  
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APPENDIX 1. UPRATING PROCEDURE FOR TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOMES 
The income information in ESS is based on the following question “please tell me which letter 
describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If 
you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.” To answer the question, the respondents 
make use of a country and wave specific showcard that contains 10 decile values estimated on an 
alternative data source (often SILC or administrative data). We have taken several steps to construct 
incomes based on these reported letters. 
In the first step, every letter is converted to its corresponding monetary value. For the first nine 
deciles, we selected the midpoint of each decile, assuming an approximately uniform distribution 
within each decile. Things are more intricate for the top decile, as that is defined as “y or up”, were y 
denotes the decile value of the 10th decile. We select the monetary value corresponding to the top 
decile by searching on a fine grid for the monetary value that leads to the equivalized income 
distribution with the Gini coefficient which is closest to the Gini coefficient of SILC in 2008.29 For 
most countries we could select a monetary value for the top decile such that the Gini corresponds 
very well to the external source. Yet, for Czech Republic, Greece and Norway in 2008 the income 
distribution used in this analysis underestimates the inequality, whereas for Slovenia  inequality is 
too high. In 2010, the figures for Denmark, France , the Netherlands and Slovenia are based on 
underestimations of inequality and those for Norway are too large. Yet, the discrepancies between 
the Gini coefficient used here and the Gini coefficient from SILC overall remain reasonable. 
In the second step, the obtained income distribution is uprated, such that the average corresponds 
to the “Real net national income at the price levels and PPPs of 2005” as provided by the OECD.30 
This uprating corrects for missing income components and price differences across the different 
countries and waves. Note that this uprating leads by construction to a perfect correspondence 
between the average income and the macro-figures and that it does not affect the (relative) Gini 
coefficient. Moreover, as the specification of the happiness equation (expression 4) includes income 
after a logarithmic transformation in an estimation with  time and country dummies, the coefficient 
of income is not affected by the uprating. 
  
                                                                
29
 Downloaded on 31 January 2013 from the Eurostat website 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di12  
30
 Downloaded on 28 January 2013 from the OECD website  
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/real-net-national-income_2074384x-table16  
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Figure 1. Weights in the S-Gini social welfare function at each percentile 
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Figure 2. Two individuals with the same preferences 
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Figure 3. The concept of equivalent income 
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Table 1 Lists of dimensions 
 
European Statistical System (2011) OECD (2011) 
Material living conditions Income and wealth 
Housing conditions 
Education Education and skills 
Natural and living environment Environmental quality 
Productive and valued activities Job and earnings 
Health Health status 
Leisure and social interactions Work-life balance 
Social connections 
Experience of life Subjective well-being 
Governance and basic rights Civic engagement and governance 
Economic and physical security Personal security 
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Table 2 Structuring the information 
 
 dimension 1 dimension 2 ... dimension k well-being 
individual 1 x11 x12 ... x1k 𝑊1(𝑥11, 𝑥12, … , 𝑥1𝑘) 
individual 2 x21 x22 ... x2k 𝑊2(𝑥21, 𝑥22, … , 𝑥2𝑘) 
... ... ... ... ...  
individual n xn1 xn2 ... xnk 𝑊𝑛(𝑥𝑛1, 𝑥𝑛2, … , 𝑥𝑛𝑘) 
AGGREGATE X1 X2 ... Xk 𝑆𝑊(𝑊1, 𝑊2 … , 𝑊𝑛) 
DISTRIBUTIONAL 
INDICATOR 
I(x11,..., xn1) I(x12,..., xn2) ... I(x1k,..., xnk) 𝐼(𝑊1, 𝑊2, … , 𝑊𝑛) 
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Table 3 Aggregation and distribution: an hypothetical example 
 
SITUATION A 
 income health well-being 
individual 1 100 10 55 
individual 2 10 100 55 
Average 55 55 55 
distribution 10/1 10/1 1/1 
 
SITUATION B 
 income health     well-being 
individual 1 100 100 100 
individual 2 10 10 10 
average 55 55 55 
distribution 10/1 10/1 10/1 
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Table 4 Dimensions included in the analysis 
 
Life dimensions Variable in ESS 
Material living conditions Total household income per capita (after uprating) 
Health Self-reported health 
Productive and valued activities Unemployment status 
Leisure and social interactions Indicator of how often the respondent meets socially with 
friends, relatives or colleagues. 
Economic and physical security Indicator of whether the respondent feels safe when walking 
alone in local area after dark 
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Table 5 Summary statistics of key variables 
Cntry 
 
Year 
 
Satisf. 
[0..10] 
Income 
 
Health 
[1..5] 
Unempl. 
(in %) 
Social 
[1..7] 
Safe 
[1..4] 
Young 
(in %) 
Female 
(in %) 
High. 
Educ 
(in %) BE 2008 7,27 27783 3,94 5,4% 5,16 3,00 54,9% 50,9% 32,4% 
BE 2010 7,51 27477 3,95 5,5% 5,23 3,02 53,4% 51,9% 39,7% 
CH 2008 7,96 30300 4,17 2,8% 5,22 3,28 57,2% 53,5% 26,6% 
CH 2010 8,14 34757 4,13 2,1% 5,22 3,26 51,7% 48,7% 29,5% 
CZ 2008 6,65 18287 3,74 4,4% 4,77 2,77 57,3% 51,3% 12,0% 
CZ 2010 6,41 16729 3,74 6,1% 4,70 2,77 60,5% 49,0% 22,8% 
DE 2008 6,95 28933 3,67 4,7% 4,78 3,03 50,1% 46,6% 35,4% 
DE 2010 7,26 28986 3,63 3,9% 4,90 3,02 52,5% 48,5% 32,6% 
DK 2008 8,52 29171 4,08 2,4% 5,42 3,28 47,8% 50,4% 39,8% 
DK 2010 8,35 28162 4,05 4,4% 5,49 3,35 49,9% 48,7% 37,1% 
EE 2008 6,20 15699 3,40 5,2% 4,54 2,76 51,5% 57,6% 36,6% 
EE 2010 6,52 12999 3,45 6,1% 4,24 2,90 49,5% 59,7% 41,6% 
ES 2008 7,31 23326 3,82 6,1% 5,45 2,92 58,7% 51,8% 23,3% 
ES 2010 7,30 22282 3,71 11,9% 5,33 3,06 57,6% 51,5% 28,0% 
FI 2008 7,94 27696 3,80 3,4% 5,09 3,25 50,2% 50,9% 30,6% 
FI 2010 7,94 25828 3,78 5,1% 5,09 3,29 48,1% 51,5% 39,1% 
FR 2008 6,35 26593 3,82 5,5% 5,22 3,08 55,6% 54,0% 30,8% 
FR 2010 6,34 25779 3,80 6,5% 5,13 3,03 51,2% 52,3% 26,3% 
GB 2008 7,08 31142 3,97 4,3% 4,99 2,80 56,5% 52,4% 44,0% 
GB 2010 7,17 29794 3,93 5,3% 4,98 2,91 52,8% 54,6% 31,8% 
GR 2008 6,06 21938 4,33 9,1% 4,17 2,64 65,6% 53,9% 24,6% 
GR 2010 5,71 19388 4,22 11,8% 3,90 2,55 57,2% 55,6% 21,9% 
HU 2008 5,29 13887 3,42 8,3% 3,80 2,71 52,1% 53,7% 20,1% 
HU 2010 5,84 13244 3,45 6,4% 3,67 2,72 52,1% 54,2% 23,5% 
NL 2008 7,69 31789 3,89 1,7% 5,42 2,98 52,0% 51,3% 31,9% 
NL 2010 7,77 30497 3,82 2,4% 5,40 3,01 50,6% 53,1% 30,0% 
NO 2008 7,89 43027 4,04 1,4% 5,48 3,40 57,4% 47,9% 43,8% 
NO 2010 7,93 41706 4,04 3,8% 5,56 3,38 54,8% 50,4% 43,6% 
PL 2008 6,87 14262 3,62 4,6% 4,28 3,03 56,3% 52,8% 21,9% 
PL 2010 7,00 15038 3,68 6,3% 4,29 3,07 56,5% 51,9% 24,3% 
RU 2008 5,47 14367 3,22 4,5% 4,42 2,65 59,0% 57,6% 52,6% 
RU 2010 5,70 13020 3,31 5,3% 4,49 2,79 59,7% 57,8% 51,9% 
SE 2008 7,86 31161 4,03 3,0% 5,38 3,25 52,9% 49,8% 26,3% 
SE 2010 7,91 30379 4,04 3,7% 5,41 3,25 50,0% 52,0% 37,3% 
SI 2008 6,93 22199 3,57 3,8% 4,49 3,14 56,1% 53,7% 20,8% 
SI 2010 6,97 20205 3,65 6,1% 4,60 3,25 51,7% 53,5% 20,5% 
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Table 6 Coefficients of dimensions and interaction effects in the life satisfaction regression 
 life satisfaction  
income (logarithm) 0.375*** (0.0198) 
health (τ = 0.62) 1.010*** (0.0196) 
unemployed -0.820*** (0.0532) 
social interaction (τ = 0.34) 0.380*** (0.0142) 
safety (τ = 0.95) 0.241*** (0.0177) 
female × income 0.0441+ (0.0228) 
high education × income 0.0148* (0.00683) 
young × health -0.0217+ (0.0129) 
high education × health -0.0735* (0.0311) 
female × unemployed 0.225** (0.0744) 
female × safety -0.0590** (0.0221) 
N 52137  
pseudo R2 0.085  
Standard errors in parentheses (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001). Results from ordered logit 
regression including as controls:  household size, education, education squared, gender, age, age (squared), marital 
status, dummies for being religious, urban, belonging to ethnic minority, time and country. 
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Table 7 Average (Equivalent) Incomes and growth between 2008 and 2010 (ranks in italics) 
  2008 
 
2010 
 
Growth 
 
Country Income 
Equi. 
Inc. Income 
Equi. 
Inc. Income 
Equi. 
Inc. 
BE 27783 4669 27477 4674 -0.55% 0.05% 
  8 8 8 6 4 8 
CH 30300 8025 34757 8659 7.35% 3.95% 
  5 3 2 2 1 2 
CZ 18287 2379 16729 2011 -4.26% -7.74% 
  14 14 14 14 14 17 
DE 28933 3435 28986 3637 0.09% 2.94% 
  7 12 6 10 3 4 
DK 29171 8291 28162 7626 -1.73% -4.01% 
  6 2 7 4 8 12 
EE 15699 1423 12999 1227 -8.60% -6.89% 
  15 16 18 16 18 16 
ES 23326 3459 22282 3499 -2.24% 0.58% 
  11 11 11 11 11 7 
FI 27696 4732 25828 4297 -3.37% -4.60% 
  9 7 9 8 13 13 
FR 26593 4547 25779 3963 -1.53% -6.42% 
  10 9 10 9 6 15 
GB 31142 6026 29794 5923 -2.16% -0.85% 
  4 5 5 5 10 9 
GR 21938 3476 19388 2848 -5.81% -9.04% 
  13 10 13 13 17 18 
HU 13887 891 13244 863 -2.32% -1.55% 
  18 17 16 18 12 10 
NL 31789 5090 30497 4609 -2.03% -4.73% 
  2 6 3 7 9 14 
NO 43027 11773 41706 11044 -1.54% -3.10% 
  1 1 1 1 7 11 
PL 14262 1548 15038 1615 2.72% 2.16% 
  17 15 15 15 2 5 
RU 14367 827 13020 890 -4.69% 3.79% 
  16 18 17 17 16 3 
SE 31161 7234 30379 7973 -1.25% 5.11% 
  3 4 4 3 5 1 
SI 22199 2824 20205 2889 -4.49% 1.15% 
  12 13 12 12 15 6 
Table 8 Dimension contributions to equivalent income in 2008 
Country Income Health Unempl. Social. Safety Equi.Inc. Health Unempl. Social. Safety Equi.Inc. 
BE 27783 10716 26884 17286 18394 4669 -61% -3% -38% -34% -83% 
CH 30300 15290 29906 19119 23091 8025 -50% -1% -37% -24% -74% 
CZ 18287 6315 17884 10032 10558 2379 -65% -2% -45% -42% -87% 
DE 28933 8503 28255 15742 19644 3435 -71% -2% -46% -32% -88% 
DK 29171 14953 28856 19517 22760 8291 -49% -1% -33% -22% -72% 
EE 15699 3801 15306 8490 9442 1423 -76% -3% -46% -40% -91% 
ES 23326 8031 22368 15235 14690 3459 -66% -4% -35% -37% -85% 
FI 27696 9769 27171 16639 20640 4732 -65% -2% -40% -25% -83% 
FR 26593 9309 25923 16874 18785 4547 -65% -3% -37% -29% -83% 
GB 31142 15211 30501 18591 19938 6026 -51% -2% -40% -36% -81% 
GR 21938 13089 20861 9461 12688 3476 -40% -5% -57% -42% -84% 
HU 13887 3101 13241 5655 7852 891 -78% -5% -59% -43% -94% 
NL 31789 10632 31533 21365 20705 5090 -67% -1% -33% -35% -84% 
NO 43027 20083 42655 29230 34692 11773 -53% -1% -32% -19% -73% 
PL 14262 4113 13948 6776 9370 1548 -71% -2% -52% -34% -89% 
RU 14367 2445 14133 7279 8060 827 -83% -2% -49% -44% -94% 
SE 31161 14098 30638 20367 23381 7234 -55% -2% -35% -25% -77% 
SI 22199 6292 21830 11662 15570 2824 -72% -2% -47% -30% -87% 
  
Table 9 Inequality of incomes and equivalent incomes in 2008 and 2010 for various values of the 
bottom sensitivity parameter (ranks in italics) 
  2008       2010       
  Income   Equivalent income Income   Equivalent income 
Country ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 
BE 0.31 0.54 0.66 0.90 0.31 0.52 0.66 0.91 
  7 7 5 5 8 5 5 3 
CH 0.37 0.59 0.66 0.90 0.34 0.57 0.65 0.91 
  17 16 6 6 14 13 3 3 
CZ 0.25 0.45 0.70 0.93 0.27 0.46 0.73 0.95 
  1 1 11 12 1 1 10 12 
DE 0.34 0.57 0.70 0.93 0.33 0.56 0.73 0.95 
  13 11 12 10 11 9 11 9 
DK 0.27 0.49 0.62 0.90 0.28 0.51 0.64 0.91 
  3 3 2 4 3 4 2 5 
EE 0.34 0.57 0.76 0.95 0.34 0.57 0.78 0.96 
  11 12 18 17 13 11 18 17 
ES 0.35 0.57 0.70 0.93 0.38 0.61 0.74 0.95 
  15 13 12 11 18 17 12 13 
FI 0.29 0.52 0.67 0.91 0.29 0.52 0.68 0.93 
  6 5 7 7 4 6 7 7 
FR 0.33 0.56 0.68 0.92 0.33 0.57 0.70 0.93 
  10 8 9 8 10 12 8 7 
GB 0.39 0.65 0.69 0.94 0.36 0.62 0.71 0.95 
  18 18 10 13 16 18 9 11 
GR 0.35 0.56 0.68 0.93 0.36 0.60 0.75 0.96 
  14 10 8 9 17 15 13 14 
HU 0.29 0.53 0.75 0.96 0.30 0.53 0.76 0.96 
  5 6 16 18 6 7 17 18 
NL 0.32 0.56 0.64 0.88 0.30 0.54 0.67 0.91 
  8 9 4 1 7 8 6 2 
NO 0.27 0.48 0.62 0.89 0.29 0.50 0.64 0.91 
  2 2 2 3 4 2 1 1 
PL 0.36 0.60 0.74 0.95 0.36 0.61 0.76 0.96 
  16 17 14 15 15 16 16 14 
RU 0.34 0.58 0.76 0.95 0.33 0.59 0.75 0.95 
  12 15 17 14 12 14 13 9 
SE 0.28 0.50 0.62 0.89 0.28 0.50 0.66 0.91 
  4 4 1 2 2 2 4 5 
SI 0.32 0.58 0.74 0.95 0.32 0.57 0.75 0.96 
  9 14 15 16 9 10 15 16 
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Table 10 Social welfare of  incomes and equivalent incomes in 2008 for various values of the bottom 
sensitivity parameter (ranks in italics) 
  Income     Equivalent income   
Country ρ  = 1 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 ρ  = 1 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 
BE 27783 19309 12864 4669 1611 458 
  8 6 6 8 7 6 
CH 30300 19059 12423 8025 2753 770 
  5 8 8 3 4 4 
CZ 18287 13697 10040 2379 726 159 
  14 14 11 14 13 13 
DE 28933 19125 12441 3435 1041 251 
  7 7 7 12 12 11 
DK 29171 21236 14906 8291 3159 837 
  6 4 3 2 2 2 
EE 15699 10440 6735 1423 346 67 
  15 15 15 16 16 16 
ES 23326 15069 9984 3459 1048 249 
  11 12 12 11 11 12 
FI 27696 19609 13266 4732 1562 416 
  9 5 5 7 8 7 
FR 26593 17764 11754 4547 1446 355 
  10 10 9 9 9 9 
GB 31142 18903 10869 6026 1850 380 
  4 9 10 5 5 8 
GR 21938 14326 9587 3476 1116 261 
  13 13 13 10 10 10 
HU 13887 9860 6569 891 219 34 
  18 16 16 17 17 18 
NL 31789 21648 14019 5090 1848 621 
  2 3 4 6 6 5 
NO 43027 31582 22546 11773 4486 1283 
  1 1 1 1 1 1 
PL 14262 9199 5691 1548 398 79 
  17 18 18 15 15 15 
RU 14367 9540 6063 827 203 45 
  16 17 17 18 18 17 
SE 31161 22592 15736 7234 2763 810 
  3 2 2 4 3 3 
SI 22199 15073 9435 2824 723 138 
  12 11 14 13 14 14 
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Table 11 Social welfare of incomes and equivalent incomes in 2010 for various of the bottom 
sensitivity parameter (ranks in italics) 
  Income     Equivalent income   
Country ρ  = 1 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 ρ  = 1 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 
BE 27477 19097 13299 4674 1575 425 
  8 7 6 6 6 6 
CH 34757 22940 14841 8659 3022 788 
  2 2 3 2 2 2 
CZ 16729 12212 8983 2011 543 105 
  14 14 11 14 14 14 
DE 28986 19450 12754 3637 971 200 
  6 6 7 10 10 10 
DK 28162 20164 13828 7626 2738 656 
  7 5 5 4 4 4 
EE 12999 8631 5590 1227 267 50 
  18 18 17 16 16 16 
ES 22282 13904 8668 3499 913 168 
  11 11 13 11 11 11 
FI 25828 18415 12423 4297 1362 301 
  9 9 8 8 8 8 
FR 25779 17401 11059 3963 1189 277 
  10 10 10 9 9 9 
GB 29794 19038 11262 5923 1706 314 
  5 8 9 5 5 7 
GR 19388 12331 7716 2848 726 128 
  13 13 14 13 13 12 
HU 13244 9337 6225 863 204 35 
  16 16 15 18 18 18 
NL 30497 21256 14120 4609 1539 429 
  3 4 4 7 7 5 
NO 41706 29736 20686 11044 4020 1038 
  1 1 1 1 1 1 
PL 15038 9700 5895 1615 392 73 
  15 15 16 15 15 15 
RU 13020 8710 5286 890 227 49 
  17 17 18 17 17 17 
SE 30379 21934 15068 7973 2743 686 
  4 3 2 3 3 3 
SI 20205 13780 8769 2889 731 124 
  12 12 12 12 12 13 
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Table 12 Yearly growth rate in social welfare between 2008 and 2010 for incomes and equivalent 
incomes (ranks in italics) 
  Income     Equivalent income   
Country ρ  = 1 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 ρ  = 1 ρ  = 2 ρ  = 5 
BE -0.55% -0.55% 1.69% 0.05% -1.11% -3.52% 
  4 5 4 8 6 4 
CH 7.35% 10.18% 9.73% 3.95% 4.89% 1.14% 
  1 1 1 2 2 2 
CZ -4.26% -5.42% -5.26% -7.74% -12.59% -17.21% 
  14 16 14 17 17 17 
DE 0.09% 0.85% 1.26% 2.94% -3.35% -10.12% 
  3 3 5 4 7 10 
DK -1.73% -2.53% -3.62% -4.01% -6.67% -10.85% 
  8 9 12 12 13 11 
EE -8.60% -8.67% -8.51% -6.89% -11.33% -12.40% 
  18 18 17 16 16 13 
ES -2.24% -3.87% -6.59% 0.58% -6.43% -16.29% 
  11 13 16 7 12 16 
FI -3.37% -3.04% -3.18% -4.60% -6.39% -13.89% 
  13 12 10 13 11 14 
FR -1.53% -1.02% -2.96% -6.42% -8.89% -10.90% 
  6 7 9 15 15 12 
GB -2.16% 0.36% 1.81% -0.85% -3.90% -8.66% 
  10 4 2 9 9 8 
GR -5.81% -6.96% -9.76% -9.04% -17.47% -25.45% 
  17 17 18 18 18 18 
HU -2.32% -2.65% -2.62% -1.55% -3.52% 1.00% 
  12 10 8 10 8 3 
NL -2.03% -0.91% 0.36% -4.73% -8.35% -15.50% 
  9 6 6 14 14 15 
NO -1.54% -2.92% -4.13% -3.10% -5.19% -9.56% 
  7 11 13 11 10 9 
PL 2.72% 2.72% 1.80% 2.16% -0.68% -3.97% 
  2 2 3 5 5 5 
RU -4.69% -4.35% -6.41% 3.79% 5.98% 4.79% 
  16 15 15 3 1 1 
SE -1.25% -1.46% -2.12% 5.11% -0.37% -7.69% 
  5 8 7 1 4 7 
SI -4.5% -4.3% -3.5% 1.2% 0.6% -5.1% 
  15 14 11 6 3 6 
 
